



v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). In other words, there must be “a sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint itself.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction “may never issue to prevent an injury or harm which not even the moving party contends was caused by the wrong claimed in the underlying action.” Omega World Travel, 111 F.3d at 16.

Applying these standards, the court concludes that Carter’s motion for a temporary restraining order must be denied. The motion does not address any of the requirements set forth in Winter, much less make a “clear showing” as to each requirement. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; see also Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that each Winter factor must be satisfied). Additionally, to the extent that Carter claims that prison officials at Sussex I State Prison are interfering with or depriving him of his right to access the courts, such claim is entirely different from the claims asserted in the operative complaint. Consequently, the claim cannot provide the basis for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction in this action. Devose, 42 F.3d at 471.

For these reasons, it is hereby **ORDERED** that Carter’s motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 297, is **DENIED**. The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to the parties.

It is so **ORDERED**.

Entered: May 3, 2024



Michael F. Urbanski  
Chief U.S. District Judge  
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Michael F. Urbanski  
Chief United States District Judge